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We extend a sociophysics model of two-group conflict dynamics to three groups.
The model with attractors and chaos is proposed as a tool for exploring and man-
aging intractable conflicts. It can be used to generate scenarios of trajectories and
outcomes. We use mean-field theory for long-range interactions to study the time
dependence of the three grousp’ mean attitudes. We find that at some intermedi-
ate temperatures the group mean attitudes oscillate in time. Independent of initial
conditions, trajectories converge overtime to an attractor in the three-dimensional
space of mean attitudes. We use Monte Carlo simulations to explore short-range
group interactions and find chaotic unpredictable time variation of attitudes at high
temperatures. For illustrative purposes we apply the model to the Bosnia and Herze-
govina conflict.
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2I. INTRACTABLE SOCIAL CONFLICTS AND SOCIOPHYSICS
Social conflicts have been the focus of negotiation and conflict management research for
several decades.1 Groups in conflict differ not only in their interests but also in identity, val-
ues and beliefs (e.g., see Ref. 2), and conflict frames. When lasting for relatively long time
periods that sometimes exceed the lifespan of the generation that started the strife, these con-
flicts are deemed intractable, resistant to resolution, or in Valacher et al.’s terms3,”seemingly
intractable.”4 Bercovitch5 observed that intractable conflicts self-perpetuate, are difficult to
manage, and revolve not only around differences of the moment but also around deep-rooted
issues; some give rise to violent episodes. Burgess and Burgess (2003)6 classified the causes
of intractability into irreconcilable value or moral differences, high-stakes distributional is-
sues (resources) and/or domination issues (power). Intractable conflicts often have a mix of
causes from all three categories.
Depending on the context and scale of a conflict and on the types of potential negative
consequences, management tools include diplomacy, mediation, advocacy on behalf of a
stakeholder group, legal procedures, attempts to foster peaceful dialog between disputing
groups, and even military interventions. Media play a (not always constructive) role in such
processes7. Besides knowledge of the stakeholders’ interests, their history, cultures, interests,
institutional arrangements and other specific case-based details, managing conflicts requires
ability to explore possible futures in order to construct effective strategies. Intractable
conflicts are challenging in this respect: they are complex and emergent, and embedded in
interrelated and changing, broader social systems. Therefore, predicting outcomes based on
the situation of the moment is likely to be misleading. However, to strategize, make a move,
or to accept/reject proposals for settling a conflict, groups need to evaluate possible results
of alternative courses of action. Anticipatory scenarios may be helpful in exploring various
possible futures8–12.
A useful set of tools for generating anticipatory scenarios in multiparty, complex, in-
tractable conflicts comes from sociophysics. Several authors, for instance Wilson (1969),
Stauffer (2003), Galam (2012), Barnes and Wilson (2014), Godoy et al. (2017), and
Schweitzer (2018),13–18 offer overviews of how physics tools have been applied to various
aspects of social processes. Examples include attitude changes19, economics20, social net-
work measures21, social dynamics22, and social interaction processes23. Modeling of various
3aspects of intractable conflicts is illustrated by Coleman et al. (2007)24, Liebovitch et al.
(2008)25, and Kaufman and Kaufman (2013)9.
Sociophysics is not without critics. Majorana and Mantegna (2006)26 question the degree
of similarity between physical particles and people, who unlike particles, have agency. After
deploring that ”God gave physics the easy problems,” Bernstein et al. (2000)8 argued that
the analogy between physical and social phenomena is weak, if judged by the poor predictive
performance of social models built as if they were representing physical phenomena. Their
critique refers chiefly to the lack of precise, broadly accepted definitions for social variables
of interest, unlike in physics, as well as lack of sufficient numbers of similar cases to afford
generalizations and reliable predictions. Indeed, although both physical and social systems
are complex and display emergent behaviors, unlike physical particles humans do not follow
predictable rules, such that given the same conditions the same results obtain. Bernstein
et al. (2000)8 described how molecules differ from people for prediction purposes. Their
critique is apt for attempts, as Stewart (1950)27 had proposed, to predict social behaviors
using physics methods despite these differences.
Sociophysics models, however, do not necessarily seek prediction in the same sense as
social models. Rather, by using physics analogies, they help capture patterns and trajectories
of complex social systems, yielding a range of future possibilities that decision makers in a
particular situation need to take into account as they prepare strategies. While discouraging
the use of physics models for social theory building and making point predictions, Bernstein
et al.’s (2000) statement that8, ”Knowledge of structure and process also allows conscious
and far-reaching transformations of social systems” supports the use of such models in efforts
to understand interactive systems in order to intervene and change course when necessary.
Statistical physics models of social systems with a large number of members, each in-
teracting with a subset of others, have been used in very diverse domains such as culture
dynamics, crowd behavior, information dissemination22 and social conflicts11? ,12. Buchanan
(2007)28 observed that such models rely on the fact that large societal groups display surpris-
ing regularities despite individual agency. In response to the critique of oversimplification
of social dynamics when representing them with statistical physics tools, Castellano et al.
(2000)22 note that ”in most situations qualitative (and sometimes quantitative) properties of
large scale phenomena do not depend on the microscopic details of the process. Only higher
level features, such as symmetries, dimensionality or conservation laws, are relevant for the
4global behavior.”29 Thus, it is not necessary to assume that humans behave mechanistically,
which is a critique frequently leveled at sociophysics models.
In this article, we illustrate the utility of sociophysics to the study of intractable social
conflicts by considering the political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the site
of long-standing conflicts (e.g., Friedman 201338). In the next section we extend to three
groups the Diep et al. (2017) model11 of two groups in conflict. In Section III, we describe
the three groups in the BiH conflict, which has flared up again ahead of 2018 presidential
elections. In Sections IV and V we report results of our model applied to the BiH situation,
using the mean-field approach for long-range interactions, and Monte Carlo simulations for
short-range interactions. Section VI is a qualitative discussion of the model results in general
and for the BiH conflict.In Section VII we offer concluding remarks.
II. THE MODEL
We assume, as in the two-group model11, that in each of three disputing groups each
individual has a preference or attitude s, such that −Mn ≤ s ≤ Mn (n=1, 2, 3), regarding
whether or not to engage with the other group to resolve the conflict. Individuals whose
attitudes s = −Mn or close to it are the most open to compromise, being only very loosely
attached to their group’s identity or ideology. Those with attitudes around Mn stick to their
goals to the point of confrontation if necessary, due to strong adherence to their own group’s
ideology, and willingness to defend it by any means. This attitude leads to opposition to
concessions. The 0 midpoint of this range represents adherence to the values of one’s group,
combined with willingness to find a way out of the conflict with the opposing groups.
As in the two-group model, we also assume that each group is a network of members
interacting with each other. This linkage pattern among members of a group based on some
shared characteristics is called homophily (see McPherson et al.30 and Aiello et al.31). In the
words of McPherson et al., ”similarity breeds connection”. The networks can interact with
each other, forming a multiplex. Within each group, each individual acts with a certain
intensity to persuade others to his/her point of view, and is in turn subject to others’
persuasion efforts. In any group, the individuals’ stances are also affected indirectly by the
”average” stances of the other groups.
The three-group model yields group preference averages sn(n = 1, 2, 3) at any time t,
5which result from the members’ intra-group mutual interactions, and consideration of the
average attitudes of opposing groups. The intra-group intensity of advocacy (which we
conceptualize as negative energy) of an individual from group n is Jn ∗ s ∗ sn, where sn is
the average of all individual preferences in group n. When an individual’s stance is affected
by another group, the inter-group intensity of interaction (negative energy) is taken to be
proportional to the product between that individual’s preference s and the mean value of
the preferences of the other groups’ members. For example, for an individual in group 1:
K12∗s∗s2+K13∗s∗s3, where K1j(j = 2, 3) captures the individual’s reaction to the average
attitudes in groups 2 and 3.
The two-group model11 had 4 parameters (2 Js and 2 Ks); for three-group there are 9
parameters (3 Js and 6 Ks), and in general an n−group model will have n
2 parameters (n Js
and n2− n Ks), rapidly increasing the levels of computational and representation difficulty.
However, useful insights can be derived from the n = 3 model.
Unlike in physics32, the matrix of inter-group interactions is not necessarily symmetrical:
Kmn 6= Knm because of human agency. While physics phenomena obey Newton’s third
law,the magnitudes of human action and reaction do not have to be equal. Rather, the
effect of group n on group m can be different in magnitude and sign from the effect group m
has on group n. When Kmn and Knm have opposite signs a ”frustration-like” effect emerges:
a positive sm induces a negative s value in group n because of negativity of Knm; a negative
sn induces negative s value in group m because of positivity of Kmn.Thus while group n
acts on group m positively, eliciting a ”tit-for-tat” response in the latter (similar values of
the corresponding attitudes), group m may act on group n negatively, eliciting ”contrarian”
responses.33
A temperature, reflecting contextual factors and quantified in the model by means of the
Boltzmann probability distribution, drives the variability in individual preferences s in a
group. Our dynamic model captures the evolution of group preferences by assuming that
the intensity of interactions involves the product of individuals’ preferences at a current
time and average preferences of opposing groups at an earlier time. This lag reasonably
reflects the fact that results of individuals’ persuasion efforts in one time period are likely
to materialize in a later time period.
As in the two-group model, we study the three-group multiplex first using a mean-field
approach and then with Monte Carlo (MC) simulations, because each approach captures
6different aspects of the interactions. We illustrate next the kinds of insights this model can
provide by applying it to the Bosnia and Herzegovina conflict.
III. EXAMPLE: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Numerous three-group conflicts at different scales, intra-national as well as international
are intractable, or protracted. They can be latent over stretches of time, and occasionally
erupt in violent episodes that mark people’s memories for a long time. Specific events
can trigger the flare-ups. Both international and intra-national conflicts can have ethnic,
political, resources and environmental issues. They share characteristics captured by our
model: they are resistant to resolution and unfold over long time periods, recurring even
after having been seemingly settled for a while; the three disputing groups are homophilic
and differ from each other in values, immediate and long-term interests, in the intensity with
which they involve themselves in the disputes, in their internal cohesion - the strength of
linkages between group members - and in the types and strength of their linkages with the
other groups. The three groups are relatively stable, and therefore identifiable over time,
although some of their characteristics such as group size vary. The Bosnia and Herzegovina
(BiH) case shares these traits.
BiH’s Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats are headed to presidential elections in 2018 with a
heightened level of ethnic strife (Tamkin 201834 and Sito-Sucic 201835) that otherwise ebbs
and flows along the years. Some basic data convey a sense of scale. With 20 square miles
(51km2) BiH had a population of approximately 3.5 million at the last census of 2013,
published in 201636 and contested by Serbs. Half the population is Bosniak (Muslim). The
other half is composed of Serbs (Orthodox, 31%) and Croats (Catholic, 15%). Formerly part
of Yugoslavia, BiH declared independence (and was recognized internationally) in 1992. That
year, a violent interethnic war erupted, which ended with the General Framework Agreement
for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Accords) of 1995 between the presidents
of Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia.
The Dayton Accords stipulated BiH’s complicated political structure37,38. It consists of
a federation of Bosniaks and Croats (FB&H, on 51% of the territory) and the Republika
Srpska (RS, on 49% of the territory). The small, multiethnic Brc˘ko District (population
83,000) was created in 2000 on land from the other two districts. Each of the three ethnic
7groups, namely Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, elects a president,39 with Brc˘ko allowed to vote
with either the FB&H or RS. The chairship of this presidency, with an 8-months term,
rotates among the three elected presidents.
A survey of attitudes among the BiH population (Prism 201340) brings out some of
the issues currently fueling conflicts both between the three ethnic groups and with the
government (see a summary of some of the issues in Table 1 ). Among the biggest reasons for
dissatisfaction, 72% cited corruption, followed by the economy and the politics (59 and 51%
respectively) and the government’s performance (27%). Only 10% of respondents said that
relations with people from another ethnic group were problematic. Perhaps this is because
BiH is highly segregated: most respondents reported living in areas where their ethnic group
is dominant (with few wishing it were different), so there may be few encounters with people
from the other groups.The percentage of respondents proud of their ethnic identity (93%)
roughly matched the percentage with pride in religious identity, and 88% were proud of their
regional identity (the three identities greatly overlap) while only 73% felt proud of being
BiH citizens. Serbs felt least attached to BiH (at 47%) and Bosniaks most (at 91%). This
indicates the three groups are homophilic and the union is not stable yet.
The respondents’ prediction of a new armed conflict within 5 years has been correct:
only one third thought it very or somewhat likely, with the Serbs least pessimistic (42%
thought armed conflict unlikely by 2018). Should BiH break apart, only 38% expected it to
happen peacefully, with 59% skeptical of this possibility. Half of respondents also wished to
separate their (national/ethnic) territory from BiH. With their own Republika Srpska, Serbs
were least interested in this possibility and half of them were disengaged, while Bosniaks
and Croats expressed more readinesss to take arms to defend their territory.
BiH respondents mostly concurred that the government, politicians and the international
community were most responsible for their problems. These contextual factors driving dis-
satisfaction correspond to temperature in our model. The respondents holding the context
repsonsible may account for their relatively high reported levels of apathy; only about 50%
are prepared to participate in the elections, with Bosniaks at the lowest level (46%) and
Croats highest at 66%. Slightly more than a third of the population would like to leave BiH.
Most predicted no change in the political arrangement among the three groups, but if they
could have their wishes only about one third of FB&H and only a quarter of Serbs would
keep this arrangement. Half of the Serb respondents preferred an independent RS. Almost
8no one expressed interest in Serbs joining Greater Serbia or Croats joining Greater Croatia.
40% of respondents (with 60% of Bosniaks) felt that eventually the ethnic entities FB&H
and RS should be abolished in favor of one Bosnia.
The underlying latent ethnic conflict is ever-present despite the seeming apathy. About
30% of respondents believe they need to reach consensus around a common truth about the
past in order to move forward. However only about 13% think they should discuss their
past grievances, or believe reconciliation is possible or important; only 12% agree that they
should ignore past grievances and focus on the future. Reconciliation is not for tomorrow:
only 40% believed in 2013 that it would happen in 5 to 10 years, with Croats most optimistic
at 63% and Serbs most pessimistic at 28%.41
The flare-up around elections, as well as previous unrests (e.g. 2014), are part of a long
stream of manifestations of the underlying long-term intractable ethnic/religious conflict
which resurfaces - at times violently - around general discontent or events such as the
breakup of the former Yugoslavia or the presidential election of 2018. For example, in the
Prism survey40, few (17%) are members of a political party to advance their views, while
76% of respondents were disengaged to angry (76% of Bosniaks, 66% of Croats, and 70% of
Serbs) with low expectations of improvement.
To study the BiH conflict dynamics, we use the Prism survey data40 to guestimate the
values of the 9 parameters of the three-group model, and then explore qualitatively (as with
a toy model) the pattern of possible outcomes of the conflict. In what follows, Bosniaks are
group 1; Serbs group 2 and Croats group 3.
The parameter values were chosen to reflect the three groups’ homophily. Serbs have the
highest internal cohesion (intragroup interaction) followed by Croats and Bosniaks: J2 >
J3 > J1. The inter-group interactions are positive, or ”Tit-for-Tat”
42, except for Bosniaks
who have been militarily dominated by Serbs and Croats. Hence if the other groups engage in
hostile behavior, Bosniaks may respond in a conciliatory manner to avert violence; however,
if the other two groups are rather conciliatory, Bosniaks may find the space to defend their
interests more aggressively. To capture these kinds of reactions we assume that K12 < 0,
K13 < 0, meaning ”non Tit-for-Tat” Bosniak responses to Serbs and Croats. Note this
instance of a social situation’s departure from physical systems’ symmetry of K values, due
to human agency. In terms of magnitude, inter-group interactions K are ordered as follows:
Bosniaks-Serbs > Croats-Bosniaks > Serbs-Croats, since larger groups should have stronger
9Issue ⇓ Percentage (%) ⇒ B&H (Total) Bosniak Serb Croat Other
Voting at elections 52.4 46.4 66.4 60.1 31.0
Joining a political party 17.1 13.2 23.6 22.1 12.4
Joining a citizens’ action group 16.4 14.9 22.5 17.4 12.1
Taking action such as demonstrating 26.6 26.9 40.6 21.2 30.0
Using violence or force if it becomes necessary 6.5 5.5 11.8 6.5 3.7
Leave BiH 36.3 32.2 46.0 38.3 56.2
TABLE I: Answers by ethnicity to the question: To what extent are you willing to take part in
the following activities? (Prism 201340)
interactions.
We show next mean-field and Monte Carlo simulation approaces results for the BiH case.
IV. MEAN-FIELD APPROACH
A. Equations
The Renyi-Erdø¨s network corresponds to our homophily assumptions about how the
individuals in the three BiH groups interact with each other. The mean of preferences s
of each group is proportional to the exponential of the intensity of interactions (negative
energy):
s1(t+ 1) =
∑M1
s=−M1
ses(j1<s1>(t)+k12<s2>(t)+k13<s3>(t))
∑M1
s=−M1 e
s(j1<s1>(t)+k12<s2>(t)+k13<s3>(t))
, (1)
s2(t+ 1) =
∑M2
s=−M2 se
s(j2<s2>(t)+k23<s3>(t)+k21<s1>(t))
∑M2
s=−M2 e
s(j2<s2>(t)+k23<s3>(t)+k21<s1>(t))
, (2)
s3(t+ 1) =
∑M3
s=−M3
ses(j3<s3>(t)+k31<s1>(t)+k32<s2>(t))
∑M3
s=−M3 e
s(j3<s3>(t)+k31<s1>(t)+k32<s2>(t))
(3)
where jn = Jn/T and kn,m = Kn,m/T for n,m = 1, 2 , 3. We use units such that kB = 1.
We introduce the lag time in equations (1) by letting the preference s at time t+1 interacts
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with the averages s1, s2 and s3 evaluated at an earlier time t. Here time is measured in
units of the delay time. The sums on the right hand sides of equations (1)-(3) involve the
Brillouin function:
B(x, y, z, j, k, l,m) = (M +
1
2
) coth[(M +
1
2
)(jx+ ky + lz)]−
1
2
coth[
1
2
(jx+ ky + lz)] (4)
Equations 1-3 can be written as:
s1(t+ 1) = B(s1(t), s2(t), s3(t), j1, k12, k13,M1) (5)
s2(t+ 1) = B(s2(t), s3(t), s1(t), j2, k23, k21,M2) (6)
s3(t+ 1) = B(s3(t), s1(t), s2(t), j3, k31, k32,M3) (7)
This model is driven by three values M (number of states for each individual in 3 net-
works), by 3 values of the intra-network couplings J , and 6 values of the inter-network
couplings K. We consider next only M1 = M2 = M3 = 3. To completely describe the
qualitative behavior of the time dependence of s1, s2, and s3 we explore a 9-dimensional pa-
rameter space. Model results for BiH are shown in subsection IVB. Figure 1 is an example
that is qualitatively different in dynamics from the BiH, illustrating the model’s versatility.
For J1 = 0.10, J2 = 0.25, J3 = 0.15, K12 = −0.10, K21 = 0.10, K23 = −0.50, K32 = 0.50,
K31 = 0.20, K13 = −0.20 and T = 1.0 there are oscillations among a discrete number of
values. Each group attitude has several different values represented by the same color in
Fig. 1 (group 1 red, group 2 blue, group 3 green). The emerging attractor has a set of
14 points that are sampled over time and connected by lines in chronological order (Figure
1b). If the temperature is increased or lowered away from T = 1.0 the attractor becomes a
continuous curve.
B. Bosnia & Herzegovina Results
We show next the qualitative dependence of the attitude dynamics for different temper-
atures, with mean-field results for J1 = 0.15, J2 = 0.35, J3 = 0.25, K12 = −0.2, K21 = 0.2,
K23 = 0.1, K32 = 0.1, K31 = 0.15, K13 = −0.15. These values are selected to represent the
BiH situation (as discussed in Section III).
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FIG. 1: (a) Time oscillations of group attitudes between a finite number of values. In order not
to clutter the figure, the points are not connected by lines ; (b) Emerging attractor over time (see
text for comments). In this figure and for all figures, groups 1, 2 and 3 are represented by red,
blue and green symbols, respectively. J1 = 0.10, J2 = 0.25, J3 = 0.15, K12 = −0.10, K21 = 0.10,
K23 = −0.50, K32 = 0.50, K31 = 0.20, K13 = −0.20 and T = 1.0.
At high temperatures, representing a context that exacerbates the BiH situation, such as
upcoming elections or international events affecting internal BiH affairs, the three groups’
attitudes s converge to zero over time (see Fig. 2), with damped oscillations as function of
time. In the three-dimensional space (s1, s2, s3) a spiral trajectory in time converges to the
origin,s1 = s2 = s3 = 0. This is a disorder point where, for each group, all possible attitudes
are equally probable, resulting in the zero average.
At lower temperatures T = 1.0 the oscillations are sustained and the three groups’ at-
titudes are synchronized exhibiting the same period.(see Fig. 3). The trajectory in the
(s1, s2, s3) space evolves in the long run to a closed-loop attractor shown in Fig. 3.
Lowering the temperatures increases the period of oscillations, and the closed-loop at-
tractor begins to fragment (Fig. 4 and Fig. 5).
We argue that the higher temperature attractor represents the essence of acute intractabil-
ity: there is no single point at which the conflict settles, but rather a never-ending (non-
sequential) cycling occurs among possible outcomes on the attractor.
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FIG. 2: (a)-(c) Damped oscillations at high T for groups 1, 2 and 3, respectively: T = 1.45;
(d) Spiral trajectory to disorder. For color codes, see Fig. 1. J1 = 0.15, J2 = 0.35, J3 = 0.25,
K12 = −0.2, K21 = 0.2, K23 = 0.1, K32 = 0.1, K31 = 0.15, K13 = −0.15, selected to represent the
BiH situation
FIG. 3: (a)-(c) Synchronized sustained oscillations for groups 1, 2 and 3, respectively at T = 1.0,
(d) Closed loop attractor. For color codes, see Fig. 1. Values of parameters: see Fig. 2.
For (context-driven) lower temperatures the attractor fragments into a discreet number of
13
FIG. 4: (a) Synchronization, (b) Fragmented attractor. T = 0.5. For color codes, see Fig. 1.
Values of parameters: see Fig. 2.
fixed points. The system still cycles among them but the discrete configuration corresponds
to a lower degree of intractability than the continuous attractor (Fig. 2):
FIG. 5: (a) Synchronization, (b) Fragmented attractor. T = 0.465. For color codes, see Fig. 1.
Values of parameters: see Fig. 2.
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At even lower temperatures the attractor collapsse into a single point that corresponds to
the ordered phase of the static model (Fig. 6). Note that because of the up-down symmetry
of the model S → −S there is another long term solution where all the attitude values are
replaced by their negatives.
FIG. 6: Fixed point, corresponding to static model ordered phase. T = 0.460. For color codes, see
Fig. 1. Values of parameters: see Fig. 2.
V. MODEL FOR MONTE CARLO SIMULATION
In this section, we use the same model as the mean-field (MF) model above, but we take
into account only short-range intra-group interactions. Each individual in group n has a
finite number of neighbors with whom he/she interacts. The intra-group Hamiltonian of
group n is
Hn = −Jn
∑
i,j
sisj (8)
where the sum is taken over nearest neighbors (NN) i and j belonging to group n, with
interaction Jn. For each group we use a triangular lattice network: each individual occupies
a site having six NN with whom he/she interacts. The use of the triangular lattice allows
us, when necessary, to introduce a percentage of intra-group frustration to take into account
”rebel” attitudes of some individuals. We will come back to this point in the discussion.
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We assume hereafter that all individuals have the same interaction Ji with their neighbors.
The strength of Ji(i = 1, 2, 3) gives each-group stability against perturbations from outside
such as the social temperature in which the group is immersed, and the influence of the
other groups.
For canonical MC simulations, we express the temperature T from the MF model (Diep
et al. 2017)11 as follows
j1(MF ) =
J1
kBT
, j2(MF ) =
J2
kBT
j3(MF ) =
J3
kBT
(9)
k12(MF ) =
K12
kBT
, k13(MF ) =
K13
kBT
k21(MF ) =
K21
kBT
, etc. (10)
where kB is the Boltzmann constant to be set to 1 hereafter.
The simulation is carried out as follows: at a given set of J parameter values, we start
by equilibrating each group without inter-group interaction. This is done with the standard
Metropolis algorithm: for each individual we calculate the field acting on him/her by the
NN. This yields an energy E1. The individual chooses his/her personal state to have the new
energy E2 with a probability proportional to exp[−(E2 −E1)/T ]. We see that if E2 >> E1
then the probability of taking the state E2 is almost zero. Conversely, if E2 ≤ E1 the change
of his/her state always occurs. We achieve a MC step t by doing this for all individuals
of the group. We repeat the steps numerous times until the equilibrium is reached (time-
independence of physical quantities).
An example is shown in Fig. 7. We see that the social temperature TC , beyond which
the stability of a group is lost, is not the same for three groups: the higher the intra-group
interaction J , the higher TC threshold.
As in the MF calculation above, an individual in a given group interacts at the time t+1
with the average of the action field created by the other groups at the earlier time t. The
only difference from the MF calculation is the short-range interaction considered in the MC
simulation. We will see that the results differ in some important aspects.
Once the equilibrium is reached for each group, we turn on the interactions between
groups at time t. As described in section II, we calculate at time t the normalized ”force”
field of group Jn acting on the other groups as
hn(t) =
∑
i∈group n
si(t)/Nn (11)
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FIG. 7: Stability of the 3 groups as a function of social temperature T before inter-group interac-
tions are turned on. J1 = 0.15, J2 = 0.35, J3 = 0.25. For color codes, see Fig. 1.
where Nn is the population of group n. An individual from group m at the time t + 1
interacts with his/her NN and with the group n at the earlier time t by
−Kmnsm(t+ 1)hn(t) (12)
where m 6= n. We calculate the strengths sn(n = 1, 2, 3) as functions of t, at a given T .
An example at low T is shown in Fig. 7 where the inter-group interactions may or not
destroy the order of a group. We have chosen the interaction strengths and signs in the
example below to illustrate the BiH case described in section III.
At higher T , the order of each group is weakened. The inter-group interactions cause
the groups’ stances to oscillate widely without periodicity as also seen in the long-range
MF results above. We observe that at times the stronger group 2 dominates the other
two. This pattern reflects the level of intractability of the three-group conflict simulated
here, consistent with the longer-term MF results. While the conflict is intractable at all
the temperatures of Figure 8, at the lower temperature (corresponding to a stable context)
the groups are ‘stuck’ in predictable ways (see Fig. 8a); as the context gets heated, the
three-group system cycles unpredictably through various stages (Fig. 8b and c).
Let us show briefly in Fig. 9 the results when the number of intra-group individual states
17
FIG. 8: Time-dependence of 3 groups’ stances at low temperatures (for color codes, see Fig. 1):
(a) T = 2.5254,all three groups are ordered; (b) T = 5.8474, groups 1 and 3 are disordered, group
2 is not disordered; (c) T = 7.5084, all 3 groups are disordered. The same parameters as in Fig.
7 have been used: J1 = 0.15, J2 = 0.35, J3 = 0.25, K12 = −0.20, K21 = 0.20, K13 = −0.15,
K31 = 0.15, K23 = 0.10, K32 = 0.10.
differs among groups. The diminution of Q causes a weaker intrinsic strength of the group as
seen by the internal energies of Group 1 and 3 in Fig. 9a. At high T Groups 1 and 3 exhibit
similar random oscillation, while the strong Group 2’s domination is very pronounced as
seen in Fig. 9b and c.
We have also examined the effect Ji. Some differences in details are found but the overall
random oscillation when 3 groups are at high T remains.
The effect of Kij has been investigated. Within small changes with respect to the values
of Kij used in Fig. 7 do not change qualitatively the results. However, when the signs of
Kij change, there are interesting changes in the long-time averages of the group strengths
as seen in Fig. 10a. The short-time oscillating behavior on the other hand does not change.
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FIG. 9: Effect of number of states Q1 = 2M1 + 1 = 5, Q2 = 2M2 + 1 = 7, Q3 = 2M3 + 1 = 5,
M1 = 2, M2 = 3, M3 = 2 (for color codes, see Fig. 1) (a) Zoom of the time-dependence of 3 groups’
stances at high T : T = 7.5084; (b) Time-dependence of the strengths of 3 groups in interaction (c)
Zoom of the oscillation. The same parameters as in Fig. 7 have been used: J1 = 0.15, J2 = 0.35,
J3 = 0.25, K12 = −0.20, K21 = 0.20, K13 = −0.15, K31 = 0.15, K23 = 0.10, K32 = 0.10.
VI. DISCUSSION
Our discussion of BiH conflict specifics and the insights for it derived with mean-field
computations and Monte Carlo simulations is combined with discussion of some of the three-
group model’s general features and implications for applying sociophysics to the analysis of
social conflicts.
The application to BiH considered the three groups to be homophilic. We note that if a
group is relatively small (as in the Serbs’ case) assuming that each individual interacts with
everyone else is not unreasonable, and the mean-field results describe this well. If a group is
large (e.g. Bosniaks), interactions may be more localized (among neighbors) with a distance
decay effect on mutual persuasion. The Monte Carlo results represent this situation, which
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FIG. 10: Effect of Kij: Q1 = Q2 = Q3 = 7, M1 = M2 = M3 = 3 (for color codes, see Fig. 1) (a)
Long-time average of group strengths as function of T (b) Time-dependence of 3 groups’ stances at
T = 5.8474 (c) Time-dependence of 3 groups’ stances at high T : T = 7.5084. The same parameters
as in Fig. 7 have been used: J1 = 0.15, J2 = 0.35, J3 = 0.25, but K13 and K32 change their sign:
K12 = −0.20, K21 = 0.20, K13 = +0.15, K31 = 0.15, K23 = 0.10, K32 = −0.10.
can yield chaotic time series of the attitudes. Results of chaotic patterns are unpredictable
except for extremely short time ranges.
In general with asymmetric and opposite-sign Ks (like BiH) the temperature effects (cor-
responding to the intensity with which the context affects the conflict) are as follows: at
low temperatures, each group sticks to its own stance in time, with little or no effect of
the inter-group influences; at high temperatures, the system becomes disordered, and all
attitudes average out to zero; at intermediate temperatures, attitudes move toward an at-
tractor, constantly shifting among points on it but never settling on any. At the high end
of intermediate temperatures, the attractor is continuous (i.e. there is an infinity of combi-
nations of the average group attitudes); at the lower end of the intermediate temperatures,
the resulting attractor is discrete, with a limited number of possible s combinations. The
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attractor morphology can be used to characterize the level of intractability, which increases
with the temperature.
Interveners in conflicts can use the temperature results to strategize at a point in time
(which is necessarily in a short time range, because the longer the time period considered,
the more likely it is that parameters and context change): they may want to raise the
temperature or lower it to defuse the conflict or even give it a push to agreement. However,
altering the context (i.e. temperature) in a desired direction through intervention is a tall
order. In reality, the kinds of actions intervenors can take correspond (in our model) to
altering the J and K values in a conflict. Intractable conflicts require repeated interventions
in time to change the system’s path. Arguably, less external attention to, or pressure on
the dynamics preceding the BiH elections might lower the temperature, but that is not
necessarily in the interest of all the external players.
We note that for our choice of parameter values based loosely on the Prism survey,
the BiH conflict appears intractable in the long run at all temperatures (Figures 2 to 5).
Interveners and contextual events may alter the parameter values sufficiently to set it on
a different course. Although additional analysis might surface the parameter values that
might eventually yield settlement, it does not necessarily mean that we can attain them now
through the right moves, since they result from a complex combination of future changes in
parties and in their context.
Negotiation theory holds that qualitative differences between two and three parties in
conflict exist due in part to an increase in process intricacies, to the possibility of coalitions
and to the complexity of multiparty conflicts. Neither process nor coalition formation are
directly captured by our model. Therefore, the two- and three-party models yield some
qualitatively similar results. On the other hand, the increased level of complexity is reflected
in the three-party model.
In the negotiation literature, some conflicts are discussed in terms of two main groups.
Examples include Democrats and Republicans in the US, North Korea and South Korea,
or Greeks and Turks in Cyprus. However, more groups may be involved in each case and
may affect outcomes in time, either directly or indirectly through the conflict context (con-
ceptualized in our model as temperature). Ignoring such groups has practical consequences.
We may fail to make sense of observed outcomes and even resort to labeling the two dis-
puting parties irrational to account for discrepancies between the observations and theory.
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We may also offer wrong remedies. If the conflict dividing the Korean peninsula is framed
as between only two parties, we relegate some key others such as China to the background
(temperature), despite the fact that they may be actively driving the outcomes. Therefore,
temperature captures external contextual effects, but it is useful to scrutinize them and
identify components that constitute additional parties. At times, what seems to be a large
temperature impact is due to the inclusion in the context of a group with large clout. In
the BiH case, we might consider the European Union an influence group important enough
to pull out of the temperature effect. In other words, the temperature should account for
diffuse or ill-understood influences rather than actions of another major group. Although
we described in detail a three-party version, the model can accommodate additional parties
(at the computational cost of additional parameters).
Our model is tailored qualitatively to the BiH case through the choice of parameter values.
It can be tailored to other cases in the same way. This is an advantage and an important
contribution. First, theory and practice indicate that few social conflict cases are sufficiently
comparable; specifics make a sizeable difference, and there are never enough similar cases to
allow derivation of more than very broad generalities. Second, since the model produces
case-specific results, it avoids the mechanistic trap feared by Bernstein et al. (2000)?
for sociophysics applications to social sciences. Instead, given a current starting point,
it produces specific possible trajectories (or scenarios) for the consideration of stakeholders
and interveners. In specific cases, however, the longer the time span, the less likely it is
for the model parameters to remain unchanged, precisely because the conflict is dynamic,
embedded in other changing systems, and subject to changing temperatures. Therefore,
it is necessary to conduct sensitivity analyses on the choice of parameter values,44 as well
as reassess these values whenever data become available (for example, an opinion survey
conducted along similar lines as Prism after the 2018 BiH elections).
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article we have expanded a two-group model of social conflict dynamics (Diep
et al 2017)11 to three groups. It shows how conflicts among any number of groups can be
analyzed. The groups we considered are homophilic, with individuals interacting mostly
or only with members of their own group. The strength of the intragroup interactions
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J characterizes a group’s cohesion: larger J values correspond to tightly linked groups,
while lower J values corresponds to loosely connected groups. The interactions among the
conflicting groups are captured by parameters K. Individuals’ stances in one group are
affected by the average stance of individuals in the other groups.The matrix of inter-group
interactions is not necessarily symmetrical:Km,n 6= Kn,m. Unlike physics phenomena that
obey Newton’s third law, in the world of humans the magnitudes of action and reaction
are not necessarily equal. The effect of the actions of group n on group m can differ from
the effect of group m on group n. When Km,n and Kn,m have opposite signs there is a
‘frustration-like’ effect. While group n acts on group m positively, eliciting a ”tit-for-tat”
response in group m (i.e., similar values of the corresponding attitudes), group m may acts
on group n negatively. The latter responds in a ”contrarian” fashion. For example, if
group m′s average attitude is more ideological (positive value of the average stance) group
n may respond in a conciliatory fashion (negative value of the average stance). However,
social frustration effects are different from physical ones: the former can occur for only two
conflicting groups if K1,2 ∗ K2,1 < 0, while the latter is a geometric effect occurring for
example on a triangular lattice for antiferromagnetic interactions. Note that intra-group
frustration may be present in reality. To induce a level of such internal frustrations, we can
introduce a number of individuals having negative interactions with their neighbors45. Such
a realistic model will be investigated in the future.
The three-group dynamics is generated by assuming that attitudes at time t+1 are influ-
enced by the attitudes of the average stance of other groups at an earlier time t, where time
is measured in lag units. The influence of the context on the individuals and the groups
is represented by a temperature T. At high temperatures the average attitudes converge
to zero (disorder, as all attitudes occur and average out to zero) while at low temperature
they converge to the ground state values (order). At intermediate temperature interesting
dynamic phenomena emerge. In the space of the mean attitudes (s1, s2, s3) the mean-field
model exhibits an attractor that is either continuous or composed of a discrete number of
points. We associate this attractor with intractable conflicts, which recur over long time
periods while the disputants’ attitudes oscillate between a large or small number of values
respectively.
We used Monte Carlo simulations of the same model to explore the role of the range
of interactions. While in the mean-field model individuals interact with same intensity no
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matter how far apart they are geographically or socially, in the Monte Carlo simulations the
intragroup interactions are only between individuals near one another. Then we no longer
observe oscillations, but chaotic behavior emerges. Hence the intractable conflict outcomes
are unpredictable because of the chaotic nature of its dynamics.
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